浙江大学新金融论坛第18期

          2018年于美国威斯康星麦迪逊分校获经济学博士学位。

          主要研究领域为宏观经济学、货币经济学、搜索匹配理论和市场结构。

目前的研究领域聚焦于：（1）实体中介和金融中介对市场结构和社会福利的影响；

                   （2）市场搜寻摩擦对企业生产、资本积累与投资的影响；

                   （3）多种货币共存与竞争关系下的金融体系及货币政策对其的影响。

个人主页：https://gracexungong.weebly.com

This paper studies the emergence of middlemen (intermediation) and its consequences for welfare and redistribution. In Rubinstein and Wolinsky’s seminal model on intermediation, middlemen only create value when they have an exogenous advantage in their search speed. I show that this result depends critically on the restriction that middlemen can only carry indivisible quantities of goods. Taking into account the intensive margin of production and allowing them to carry divisible quantities, middlemen with comparatively high bargaining power can create value even when they have a disadvantage in their search cost. While the presence of middlemen can improve welfare, equilibria remain suboptimal due to search and participation externalities. I describe a multi-instrument tax-subsidy scheme that controls participation levels by producers and middlemen and restores efficiency.